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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Kyle Steven Bower appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of two counts of lewd conduct and one count of sexual 
abuse. Bower contends the district court erred in denying his motion to sever. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
A grand jury indicted Bower on two counts of lewd conduct and one count 
of sexual abuse of a child under 16.1 (R., Vol. 1, pp.19-21.) The first lewd 
conduct charge (Count I) and the sexual abuse charge (Count Ill) were based on 
the abuse Bower perpetrated against K.B. in 2011 and 2012. (R., Vol. 1, p.20.) 
The second lewd conduct charge (Count II) was based on the abuse Bower 
perpetrated against J.B. in 2004. (R., Vol. 1, p.20.) Bower filed a "Motion to 
Sever" the charges involving K.B. from the charge involving J.B. (R., Vol. 1, 
p.39.2) After holding a hearing on Bower's motion, the court entered a written 
order denying Bower's request to sever the charges. (Tr., pp.1-9; R., Vol. 1, 
pp.50-55.3) Bower proceeded to trial. 
At the conclusion of Bower's first trial, the jury was unable to reach a 
verdict; therefore, the court declared a mistrial. (R., Vol. 1, pp.129-130, 133-
134.) Following Bower's second trial, the jury found Bower guilty of all three 
1 The grand jury Indictment superseded a complaint alleging the same charges. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.11-13.) 
2 A copy of Bower's "Motion to Sever" is attached as Appendix A 
3 A copy of the district court's Order on Defendant's Motion to Sever is attached 
as Appendix B. 
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counts. (R., Vol. 2, pp.205, 245-246.) The court imposed concurrent unified 25-
year sentences with 10 years fixed for the lewd conduct counts and a concurrent 
unified 15-year sentence with five years fixed for the sexual abuse count. (R., 
Vol. 2, pp.288-290.) Bower filed an I.C.R. 35 motion, which the court denied. 
(R., Vol. 2, pp.313; Register of Actions, Canyon County Case No. CR-2012-274, 
entry dated 1/7/2014.) Bower timely appealed from the Judgment. (R., Vol. 2, 
pp.295-299, 305-312.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Bower states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bower's motion to sever 
because the allegations in count two were not based on the same 
act or transaction or part of a "common scheme or plan" to commit 
the allegations in counts one and three? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Bower failed to assert, much less demonstrate, any error in the 
district court's determination that severance was not required under I.AR. 14? 
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ARGUMENT 
Bower Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His "Motion To 
Sever" 
A Introduction 
Bower contends the district court erred in denying his "Motion to Sever." 
Specifically, Bower argues the court's "analysis was based on the 
misunderstanding that the motion to sever was one brought under Idaho Criminal 
Rule 14, rather than a claim that the original joinder was improper under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 8." (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Bower further argues that "[r]egardless 
of the basis for its decision to deny the motion to sever, the district court erred in 
doing so as the conduct alleged in count two was not based on the same act or 
transaction or part of a common scheme or plan to commit the conduct alleged in 
counts one and three." (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Bower's arguments lack merit. 
Because Bower never claimed joinder was improper under I.C.R. 8, his argument 
that the district court erred in denying a request it never considered is not 
properly before this Court. Since Bower has failed to challenge the actual ruling 
by the district court, the district court's decision, and Bower's convictions, should 
be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether a court improperly joined offenses pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a 
question of law, over which this Court exercises free review." State v. Field, 144 
Idaho 559, 564, 165 P.3d 273, 278 (2007) (citations omitted). "In contrast, an 
abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of a motion to 
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sever joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14; however, that rule presumes joinder was 
proper in the first place." & 
C. Bower's Claim That Joinder Was Improper Under I.C.R. 8 Is Not 
Preserved And He Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion In Denying His "Motion To Sever" Under I.C.R. 14 
The grand jury's Indictment included two charges involving K.B. and one 
charge involving J.B. (R., Vol. 1, pp.20-21.) Bower filed a "Motion to Sever" 
asking the court to "sever Count II from Counts I and Ill." (R., Vol. 1, p.39.) In 
his motion, Bower asserted the charges should be severed because (1) "[t]he 
facts and circumstances surrounding the Counts are separate and apart from 
each other"; (2) "[t]he incidents resulting in the bringing of these Counts are 
separate"; (3) "[t]he alleged victims in these Counts are different and the dates 
for the alleged acts to have been committed are years apart"; (4) a failure to 
sever would be prejudicial; and (5) severance is "in the best interests of justice." 
Bower's motion did not cite any rule or other legal authority. (See generally R., 
Vol. 1, pp.39-40.) 
At the hearing on Bower's motion, the court inquired whether either party 
filed a brief regarding Bower's request for severance. (7/19/2012 Tr., p.3, Ls.15-
16.) Defense counsel responded that he "didn't supply one" and argued: 
Judge, I simply looked at the rule. And they've got two 
different victims alleged in this information -- the indictment, I 
should say -- and quite a difference in time frame between when 
the alleged events took place. 
And, I mean, my position is it's improper to try two cases 
together because it's unduly prejudicial to Mr. Bower to have 
two separate, complete -- alleged victims talking about stuff that 
took place on completely different dates and time frames in the 
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same trial. It's just way unduly prejudicial. And that's why I 
feel they should be severed. 
(Tr., p.1, L.17, p.2, Ls.1-12 (emphasis added).) 
After the state's response, which included an assertion that the case 
presents "a situation where th[e] evidence would likely be coming in anyways 
under the 404(b) analysis, and now we have victims who have to testify twice 
and we're wasting the court's resources" (7/19/2012 Tr. p.7, Ls.15-18), defense 
counsel further argued: 
... [W]hether it comes in under 404(b), I guess I don't see that as 
the analysis to be made on whether they should be tried together or 
not. I really don't. I mean, I'm aware of what the court's talking 
about, the Longoria case, but it's not the same as -- because -- the 
full-blown allegation, having to defend against it, in my view. 
I still think that it's the type of situation where it's piling it on, 
and it's making the defendant look way more worse than he 
would in a separate trial on each -- I guess, each count or -- not 
each count, but each alleged victim. 
(7/19/2012 Tr., p.8, L.20- p.9, L.6). 
In denying Bower's motion, the district court recited the discretionary 
standards applicable to a motion to sever under I.C.R. 14 and applied those 
standards to Bower's "Motion to Sever." (R., Vol. 1, pp.51-54 (Appendix B).) 
On appeal, Bower seeks to take advantage of the de nova standard of 
review applicable to claims of improper joinder rather than the discretionary 
standard applicable to motions to sever by arguing the court "misunderst[ood]" 
his "Motion to Sever" was really a claim of improper joinder under I.C.R. 18 rather 
than a request for severance under I.C.R. 14. (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) In support 
of this argument, Bower claims the "bulk" of his "motion to sever was centered on 
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the dissimilarities between the conduct alleged in count two versus that alleged in 
counts one and three." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Based on this, he contends, his 
"motion to sever constituted a challenge to the propriety of the original joinder" 
and "therefore, review by this Court is free under Rule 8, rather than for an abuse 
of discretion under Rule 14." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Bower's argument is 
without merit. 
Nowhere in his written motion or during his argument at the related 
hearing did Bower rely on I.C.R. 8. (See generally R., Vol. 1, pp.39-40 (Appendix 
A); 7/19/2012 Tr., p.2, Ls.1-12, p.8, L.10 - p.9, L.9.) Nor did he, at any time, 
discuss the I.C.R. 8 standard, which permits joinder if the offenses charged "are 
based on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or transactions 
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." I.C.R. 
8(a). Instead, he repeatedly argued that the charges involving separate victims 
should be severed due to the potential for prejudice. (R., Vol. 1, p.39; 7/19/2012 
Tr., p.2, Ls.6-8 ("it's unduly prejudicial"), L.11 ("It's just way unduly prejudicial."), 
p.9, Ls.3-5 ("it's piling it on, and it's making the defendant look way more worse 
than he would in a separate trial on each").) 
On appeal, Bower relegates the prejudice argument he repeatedly made 
to a footnote, citing only his written motion and noting prejudice, which he 
acknowledges is "not subject to Rule 8 analysis," was only "[o]ne of the four 
reasons given." (Appellant's Brief, p.5 n.3.) This characterization of his 
argument to the district court ignores his repeated references to prejudice at the 
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argument on his motion and ignores the fact that he never once relied on I.C.R. 8 
or incorporated any of its language into his argument. 
Bower attempts to bolster his efforts to pursue an unpreserved I.C.R. 8 
argument by arguing the "district court appears to have misunderstood this 
Court's interpretation of Rule 14 when considering improperly-joined charges or 
co-defendants, despite the fact that the State cited [State v.] Fieldf., 144 Idaho 
559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007),) during argument, and that the district court itself 
mentioned Rule 8 and severance when it parenthetically described State v. 
Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 824 (Ct. App. 1999)." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) The 
nature of what Bower perceives as the district court's misunderstanding of "this 
Court's interpretation of Rule 14" or Field is unclear. The Court in Field did not 
interpret I.C.R. 14; rather, in Field, the issue was whether the district court erred 
in granting the state's motion to join two separate cases under I.C.R. 8. 144 
Idaho at 564-567, 165 P.3d at 278-281. That issue does not exist in this case 
because the state never filed a motion for joinder nor did Bower ever claim the 
initial joinder was improper. Moreover, the district court never discussed Field in 
its order denying Bower's motion and never had occasion to interpret it one way 
or another. (See generally R., Vol. 1, pp.50-54 (Appendix B).) 
As for the district court's reference to I.C.R. 8 in its parenthetical 
description of Longoria, the state fails to understands how that supports any 
claim that Bower's "Motion to Sever" was based on I.C.R. 8; if anything, the 
district court's reference to Longoria shows why Bower's arguments should be 
rejected. 
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The district court's parenthetical description of Longoria reads: 
The Longoria Court noted, in a footnote, that the defendant had not 
made any argument that the initial joinder of the charges at issue 
was impermissible pursuant to ICR 8(a), but only argued that he 
was prejudiced by the joinder. ICR 8(a) permits joinder of offenses 
in one charging document if the offenses charged are based on the 
same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions 
connected together or constituting a common scheme or plan. 
(R., Vol. 1, p.52 (Appendix B).) 
That reference to Longoria and its related parenthetical is part of a string 
citation at the conclusion of the district court's recitation of relevant legal 
standards, which reads: 
A defendant moving to sever has the burden of showing 
prejudice. Specifically, the defendant must present facts 
demonstrating that unfair prejudice would result from a joint trial of 
the charges at issue. The potential sources of prejudice recognized 
by the Idaho appellate courts are: (1) the possibility that the jury 
may confuse and cumulate the evidence, rather than keeping the 
evidence properly segregated; (2) the potential that the defendant 
may be confounded in presenting defenses; and (3) the possibility 
that the jury may conclude that the defendant is guilty of one crime 
and then find him guilty of the other crime simply because of his 
criminal disposition. 
(R., Vol. 1, pp.51-52 (citations omitted) (Appendix B).) 
As noted, and as is apparent from the foregoing excerpt, the district 
court's justified understanding of Bower's motion was that it was based on a 
request to sever under I.C.R. 14, not a claim of improper joinder under I.C.R. 8. 
The parenthetical to Longoria acknowledges there is a distinction and Bower 
never argued before or after the court's decision that his motion was based on 
anything other than a claim "that he was prejudiced by the joinder" as opposed to 
a claim that joiner was improper. See Longoria, 133 Idaho at 824 n.3, 992 P.2d 
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at 1224 n.3. Indeed, it is worth noting that, like Bower, Longoria sought 
severance "on the grounds that each count arose from a discrete and separate 
occurrence in separate years involving a different victim." Longoria, 133 Idaho at 
821, 992 P.2d at 1221. Bower's reliance on the same type of argument as a 
basis for claiming the district court should have interpreted his motion as an 
I.C.R. 8 motion rather than an I.C.R. 14 motion is not only unsupported by the 
record, any claim that the district court's analysis was inconsistent with or should 
have been different than the analysis in Longoria is without merit. 
Because Bower did not present a Rule 8 claim to the district court, and, as 
such, the district court never considered such a claim, Bower's Rule 8 argument 
is not preserved and this Court should not address it. The only claim that was 
raised and addressed by the district court was whether Bower was entitled to 
severance under I.C.R. 14. Bower has failed to show the district court abused its 
discretion in concluding severance was not required. In fact, Bower has made no 
real effort to show error under I.C.R. 14. Aside from reciting the different 
standard of review that applies to I.C.R. 14, Bower does not discuss the text of 
I.C.R. 14 or the district court's application of that rule to the facts of his case with 
the exception of a single footnote in which he identifies "[o]ne problem" with the 
district court's analysis. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.4-11 and n.5.) That 
"[o]ne problem" relates to the district court's discussion of the "potential source[ ] 
of prejudice" from joinder involving the "possibility that the jury may conclude that 
the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other crime 
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simply because of his criminal disposition." (R., Vol. 1, pp.51-52 (Appendix B).) 
In addressing this possible source of prejudice, the court stated: 
... [Bower] has provided the court with no basis to conclude that 
the jury will simply determine that he is guilty based upon the 
number of charges and/or number of victims, especially if properly 
instructed on the applicable law. In addition, the State made at 
least a prima facie showing that evidence of [Bower's] conduct in 
Count II would be admissible in a trial on Counts I and Ill and vice 
versa. 
(R., Vol. 1, pp.53-54 (Appendix B).) This conclusion was based on a comparison 
to Longoria where the Court stated: 
In his motion to sever, Longoria, argued that the jury might 
confuse and cumulate the evidence against him on three separate 
counts, thereby prejudicing him. No other information was offered 
in support of the motion. The district court denied Longoria's 
motion to sever, explaining that each count was a separate, distinct 
charge and that there was little likelihood that the jury would 
confuse the evidence. The court stated that Longoria had failed to 
establish that there was any risk that the jury would find him not 
guilty of the specific charges but nevertheless reach a guilty verdict 
on the basis of the number of charges. The court further explained 
that what little risk there was could be limited by proper jury 
instructions . . .. Here, the facts relating to each incident were 
simple, straight forward, and distinct. All three of Longoria's victims 
testified to the specific events that took place when Longoria 
molested them, as set forth in the facts and proceedings above. 
Longoria, 133 Idaho at 824, 992 P.2d at 1224 (quoted at R., Vol. 1, p.53 
(Appendix B).) 
Bower complains that "[o]ne problem with the district court's analysis is 
that it fell well short of this Court's admonition that, when considering Rule 404(b) 
evidence, 'trial courts must carefully scrutinize evidence offered as 'corroboration' 
or as demonstrating a 'common scheme or plan' in order to avoid the erroneous 
introduction of evidence that is merely probative of defendant's propensity to 
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engage in criminal behavior."' (Appellant's Brief, p.6 n.5 (quoting State v. Grist, 
147 Idaho 49, 53 (2009).) "One problem" with Bower's complaint is that the 
district court was not purporting to conduct an analysis under I.RE. 404(b), it was 
only addressing one of the possible sources of prejudice previously recognized 
by Idaho's appellate courts when considering a motion to sever under I.C.R. 14. 
See Field, 144 Idaho at 565 n.2, 165 P.3d at 279 n.2 ("whether evidence would 
have been admissible absent the joinder is only a factor in determining whether a 
proper joinder is prejudicial and not whether joinder is proper in the first place"). 
That the district court considered the question of admissibility only reinforces that 
the issue presented to and decided by the district court was one of prejudicial 
joinder under I.C.R. 14, not improper joinder under I.C.R., which may explain why 
Bower elected to address the "problem" in a footnote. In any event, it is clear 
from Bower's brief that he is not challenging the decision the district court 
actually made under I.C.R. 14, but is instead claiming the court erred in 
conducting an I.C.R. 14 analysis at all rather than an I.C.R. 8 analysis. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4 ("district court's analysis was based on the 
misunderstanding that the motion to sever was one brought under Idaho Criminal 
Rule 14, rather than a claim that the original joinder was improper under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 8").) Because Bower has failed to identify any error in the issue 
presented to and adjudicated by the district court, he is not entitled to relief. See 
State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(where a basis for a ruling by a district court is unchallenged on appeal, appellate 
court will affirm on the unchallenged basis). 
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To the extent Bower believes a motion to sever automatically invites 
review of the propriety of joinder in the first instance regardless of whether that 
question was specifically raised to the district court, such a position is erroneous. 
A claim that joinder is prejudicial under I.A.R. 14 is clearly different than a claim 
that joinder itself was improper. The former necessarily recognizes that joinder 
was proper, but that severance may be considered due to prejudice. As 
recognized in Field, I.C.R. 14 "presumes joinder was proper in the first place." 
144 Idaho at 564, 165 P .2d at 278. Because it is presumed that "joinder was 
proper in the first place," it was Bower's burden to show otherwise. Considering 
a challenge to the initial joinder for the first time on appeal under the theory that it 
is encompassed within all requests to sever not only ignores the legal 
presumption recognized in Field, it is contrary to the well-established principle 
that an issue must be preserved in the trial court to be considered on appeal. 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000) ("It is a 
fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be 
made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal. If not raised 
below, the objection may not be considered for the first time on appeal."). 
The Court of Appeals' recent opinion in State v. Orellana-Castro, 2014 WL 
4290459 (Ct. App. 2014), does not support a different conclusion. In Orellana-
Castro, the state charged the defendant with two counts of lewd conduct and two 
counts of sexual abuse of a minor for acts involving one victim, G.O., and two 
counts of sexual abuse of a minor for acts involving a separate victim, S.O. 2014 
WL 4290459 *1. Orellana-Castro filed a motion to sever "the trial of charges 
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regarding G.O. from the trial of charges regarding S.O." The Court of Appeals 
noted the different standards of review applicable to requests to sever based in 
improper joinder under I.C.R. 8 and requests to sever based on prejudice under 
I.AR. 14. kl at *2. The Court first considered the "propriety of [the] initial 
joinder." !ft Unlike this case, however, there was no contention that the Rule 8 
issue was not preserved and, therefore, no reason to conclude, from the opinion, 
that the Rule 8 issue was decided just because Orellana-Castro requested 
severance.4 If Orellana-Castro could be read to support the proposition that all 
motions to sever automatically incorporate review of the initial joinder, for the 
reasons already stated, such a proposition is contrary to existing law. 
Because Bower's Rule 8 argument is not preserved, this Court should 
decline to consider it and since Bower has failed to substantively challenge the 
district court's I.AR. 14 ruling, the district court's decision should be affirmed. 
4 In fact, a review of the Respondent's Brief filed in Orellana-Castro shows that 
the state specifically conceded that the Rule 8 issue was raised by Orellana-
Castro and decided by the district court. (Respondent's Brief, p.6 n.1, State v. 
Orellana-Castro, Docket No. 41358.) If necessary to resolve the issue in this 
case, the state asks the Court to take judicial notice of the record, transcripts, 
and pleadings in Orellana-Castro. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentences entered upon the jury verdicts finding Bower guilty of two counts of 
lewd conduct and one count of sexual abuse. 
DATED this 5th day of September, 2014. 
~~ 
J~ 
D~y Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of September 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SPENCERJ.HAHN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
/ 
/ 
~ESSICA M. LORELLO 
Qeputy A orney General 
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APPENDIX A 
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af 
SCOTT E. FOUSER, ISB No. 2968 
FOUSERLAW OFFICES, P.A. 
802 Arthur Street 
P.O. Box 606 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0606 
Telephone (208) 454-2264 
FAX (208) 454-0136 
Attorney for Defendant 
_F___,I A./;z§;) q.M. 
JUL O 5 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S Hill, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NO. CR2012-9274 
MOTION TO SEVER 
vs. AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
KYLE STEVEN BOWER, 
Defendant. 
COMES _NOW, The above-named defendant, KYLE STEVEN BOWER, and 
moves this Court to sever Count II from Counts I and III in the above case and set separate jury 
trials for the following reasons: 
1. The facts and circumstances surrounding the Counts are separate and apart 
from each other. 
2. The incidents resulting in the bringing of these Counts are separate. 
3. The alleged victims in these Counts are different and the dates for the 
alleged acts to have been committed are years apart. 
4. Having these counts together will highly prejudice defendant. 
5. This Motion is filed in the best interests of justice. 
MOTION TO SEVER AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING -1 
000039 
NOTICE OF HEARING: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the attorney for 
defendant will bring on for hearing the above Motion on the 9th day of July, 2012, at the hour 
of 2:00 o'clock, p.m., before the Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick, at the Canyon County 
Courthouse, 1115 Albany, Caldwell, Idaho. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document was delivered to the office of the CANYON 
COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY by leaving a copy of the same in his basket at the 
Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho, on this date. 
Dated this -5_ day of July, 2012. 
MOTION TO SEVER AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING -2 
Attorney for defendant 
000040 
APPENDIX B 
tf?i) L E D A.M ___ P.M. 
AUG 3 1 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
C ATKINSON, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SEVER 
vs. 
CASE NO. CR-2012-9274-C 
KYLE STEVEN BOWER, 
Defendant. 
By Superseding Indictment filed April 19, 2012, Defendant is charged with two 
counts (Counts I and II) of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child under Sixteen, in violation 
of Idaho Code Section 18-1508, and one count (Count III) of Sexual Abuse of a Child 
under Sixteen, in violation ofidaho Code Section 18-1506. 
Count I and Count III involve the same alleged victim, K.B. , and 
the same date or dates, July 1, 2011 through March 11, 2012. 
Count II involves a different alleged victim, J.B.  and a date or 
dates significantly earlier than the other two counts, May 30, 2004 through August 31, 
2004. 
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Defendant now moves for an order severing Count II for a separate trial. 
I. Legal Standards 
A. Standard of Decision: Motion to Sever 
A motion to sever is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. 
Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 907 (Ct. App. 2002). In making a discretionary determination, 
this court must: (1) correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion; (2) act within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices before it; and (3) reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
B. Standards Applicable to a Motion to Sever 
I.C.R. 14 authorizes the court to grant separate trials of separate counts if it 
appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses in a complaint, 
indictment, or information or by joinder for trial of such offenses. In ruling on a 
defendant's motion to sever, the court may order the attorney for the state to deliver to 
the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the defendant 
which the state intends to introduce into evidence at trial. ICR 14. 
A defendant moving to sever has the burden of showing prejudice. State v. 
Caudill, l 09 Idaho 222, 226 (1985). Specifically, the defendant must present facts 
demonstrating that unfair prejudice would result from a joint trial of the charges at issue. 
Eguilor, 137 Idaho at 908. The potential sources of prejudice recognized by the Idaho 
appellate courts are: (1) the possibility that the jury may confuse and cumulate the 
evidence, rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated; (2) the potential that the 
defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses; and (3) the possibility that the jury 
may conclude that the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the 
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other crime simply because of his criminal disposition. Id.; State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 
819, 824 (Ct App. 1999) (The Longoria Court noted, in a footnote, that the defendant 
had not made any argument that the initial j oinder of the charges at issue was 
impermissible pursuant to ICR 8(a), but only argued that he was prejudiced by the 
joinder. ICR 8(a) permits joinder of offenses in one charging document if the offenses 
charged are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions 
connected together or constituting a common scheme or plan.). 
II. Timeliness 
Pursuant to ICR 12(b)(5) and 12(d), a motion to sever must be filed within twenty 
eight days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven days before trial, whichever 
occurs earlier, unless, for good cause shown or excusable neglect, the court, in its 
discretion, enlarges the time. 
On June 15, 2012, this court entered an Order extending the time for filing pretrial 
motions to fourteen (14) days from defense counsel's receipt of outstanding discovery 
and/or requested transcript. It appears that Plaintiff provided certain discovery on or 
. about June 29, 2012, and Defendant filed the instant motion on July 5, 2012. 
Accordingly, the court finds that Defendant's Motion is timely. 
III. Analysis 
The stated bases for Defendant's Motion are: (1) the occurrence or occurrences 
forming the factual basis for Count II is or are entirely distinct from those forming the 
factual basis for Counts I and III; (2) the alleged victim in Count II is different from the 
alleged victim in Counts I and III and the acts that form the basis for Count II are alleged 
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to have occurred years earlier than those in Counts I and III; and (3) trying Count II with 
Counts I and III will prejudice the defendant. 
The court concludes that Defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing that 
any of the factors identified by the Idaho appellate courts as justifying severance are 
present in this case. There is no indication that the jury will confuse and cumulate the 
evidence relevant to the various counts. In fact, it would appear that the difference in 
alleged victims and the great variance in dates between Count II and Counts I and III 
would militate against a finding that the jury would be confused on the evidence 
presented on the different counts in this case. There is also indication in Defendant's 
Motion that he will have difficulty in presenting any defense or defenses if Count II is 
tried with Counts I and III. Finally, Defendant's motion papers do not support the 
conclusion that the jury may find him guilty on Count II based on its findings on Counts I 
and III, or vice versa. As the Longoria Court stated: 
In his motion to sever, Longoria argued that the jury might confuse and cumulate 
the evidence against him on the three separate counts, thereby prejudicing him. 
No other information was offered in support of the motion. The district court 
denied Longoria's motion to sever, explaining that each count was a separate, 
distinct charge and that there was little likelihood that the jury would confuse the 
evidence. The court stated that Longoria had failed to establish that there was any 
risk that the jury would find him not guilty of the specific charges but 
nevertheless reach a guilty verdict on the basis of the number of charges. The 
court further explained that what little risk there was could be limited by proper 
jury instructions. . . . Here, the facts relating to each incident were simple, 
straight forward, and distinct. All three of Longoria's victims testified to the 
specific events that took place when Longoria molested them, as set forth in the 
faets and proceedings above. 
133 Idaho at 824. Similarly, here, Defendant has provided the court with no basis to 
conclude that the jury will simply determine that he is guilty based upon the number of 
charges and/or number of victims, especially if properly instructed on the applicable law. 
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In addition, the State made at least aprimafacie showing that evidence of Defendant's 
conduct in Count II would be admissible in a trial on Counts I and III and vice versa. 
ORDER 
In light of the foregoing, Defendant's Motion to Sever Count II for a separate trial 
from Counts I and III is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this J / 5 r-day of August, 2012. 
~~~ unealC.Kerrick"'> 
District Judge 
" 
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